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certain	 views;	 and	 his	 notion	 of	 fundamentality	 avoids	 reference	 to	 establishing	 normative	
principia,	 yet	 a	 key	 benefit	 of	 grounding	 is	 to	 provide	 such.	 Finally,	 an	 examination	 of	 the	
individual	conditions	yields	that	his	first	condition	is	ambiguous,	unclear,	and	problematic;	his	
second	 condition	 for	 neutrality	 is	 unworkable.	 Therefore,	 I	 do	 not	 preclude	 any	 and	 all	




with	 their	 diverse	 objects	 of	 study1	upon	 a	 new	 scheme	 of	 metaphysics.	 	 A	 fundamental	
science,	 if	possible,	could	ask	and	answer	the	following	questions	about	 the	other	disciplines:	
how	 should	 we	 different	 disciplines	 relate	 to	 one	 another?	 Should	 we	 give	 priority	 to	 one	






His	 current	 proposal	 for	 a	 fundamental	 metaphysics	 is	 a	 new	 resolution	 to	 an	 old	
concern.	 Among	 other	 historic	 attempts,	 Robert	 Kilwardby,	 a	 contemporary	 of	 Aquinas	 and	
archbishop	of	Canterbury,	set	out	an	order	of	the	sciences	(de	ortu	scientiarum),2	wherein	the	
so-called	 ‘first	 principles’	 of	 philosophy	 would	 provide	 principia	 for	 natural	 philosophy	 and	
other	sciences.	On	the	one	hand,	 if	an	order	of	the	sciences	is	present	today,	mathematics	or	






















attempts	 and	 yet	 overcoming	 their	 respective	 limitations.	 Gracia	 has	 marked	 out	 what	 a	







metaphysics	 to	 have	 a	 fundamental	 character?	 Regarding	 the	 latter	 question,	 this	 will	 be	
discussed	after	outlining	the	conditions	below.	
Regarding	the	former	question,	it	is	not	clear	whether	these	criteria	are	to	be	taken	as	
sufficient,	 necessary,	 or	 sufficient	and	 necessary	 conditions.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 these	 criteria	
appear	 to	 function	 as	 necessary	 conditions,	 as	 his	 paper	 aims	 to	 determine	 “the	 conditions	
required	by	fundamentality.”5	Similarly:	“The	fundamental	character	of	metaphysics	must	then	
have	to	do	with	certain	conditions	that	must	be	satisfied	by	the	claims	the	discipline	makes	and	









On	 the	 assumption	 that	 Gracia	 is	 consistent,	 the	 reader	 ought	 to	 put	 these	 claims	
together	 and	 simply	 posit	 that	 the	 conditions	 are	both	 sufficient	 and	necessary.8	On	 the	one	
hand,	if	he	intended	to	merely	provide	sufficient	conditions,	then	if	it	turns	out	a	single	criterion	
were	to	be	jettisoned	or	replaced,	that	would	do	little	damage	to	his	thesis.	On	the	other	hand,	
if	 the	 criteria	 are	 sufficient	 only	 when	 held	 together,	 then	 the	 proposal	 suffers	 if	 but	 one	
condition	 is	 undermined.	 In	 what	 follows,	 I	 will	 make	 a	 case	 that	 two	 conditions	 can	 be	
undermined.	
Gracia’s	Five	Conditions	
	 If	 metaphysics	 could	 be	 a	 fundamental	 discipline,	 what	 character	 would	 it	 have?	








• (4c)	 overall	 disciplinary	 integration:	 the	 claims	 made	 in	 metaphysics	 about	 its	 object	
must	include	claims	that	serve	to	understand	how	the	claims	made	by	other	disciplines	












be	 decided	 later,	 and	 nothing	 can	 be	 excluded	 from	 the	 outset.	 Third,	 a	 fundamental	
metaphysics	 must	 ask	 and	 answer	 distinct	 questions	 that	 other	 disciplines	 do	 not.	 Fourth,	




	 The	 conditions,	 as	 presented,	 do	 not	 succeed	 in	 establishing	 a	 metaphysics	 with	
fundamental	 character.	 There	 are	 at	 least	 two	 concerns	 if	 it	 were	 to	 be	 admitted	 as	 a	
fundamental	science.	Moreover,	as	will	be	explained	below,	there	seems	to	be	problems	with	
the	conditions	themselves.	The	first	concern:	Gracia	 is	 insufficiently	 inclusive	even	on	his	own	
terms.	 As	Gracia	 proposes	 a	metaphysics	 that	 satisfies	 his	 first	 condition,	 he	 suggests	 that	 it	
would	investigate	metaphysical	matters	in	the	following	way:	









Ted	 Sider’s	 realism	 about	 structure)	 which	 explicitly	 seek	 to	 “go	 beyond	 the	 predicate.”11	It	




conditions:	 either	 Universal	 Extension	 or	 Ontological	 Neutralism.	 Either	 way,	 revision	 is	
necessary.12	
My	 second	 concern:	Gracia	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 afford	 us	 the	 traditional	 benefits	 of	 a	
fundamental	 science.	 Fundamentality	 allows	 for	 mediation,	 perhaps,	 but	 how	 might	
metaphysics	mediate	without	establishing	the	“first	principles”?	Yet	Gracia	finds	 limited	value	
in	 that	 approach.13	Mediation	 implies	 norms	 by	 which	 to	 govern	 the	 relationships	 between	
disciplines.	 I	 have	 in	 mind	 that	 a	 fundamental	 metaphysics,	 if	 it	 grounds	 anything,	 would	
provide	some	sort	of	principia	(first	principles,	first	philosophy),	whether	in	the	form	of	“logical	
principles”	or	“ultimate	causes”	(not	just	efficient	causes,	but	rather	explanations	or	becauses).	
Even	 the	 role	 of	mediation	 assumes	 the	 possession	 of	 those	 principia,	 since	 it	 is	 by	 them	 it	
arbitrates.	If	principia	are	not	desiderata	of	a	fundamental	metaphysics,	I	am	unaware	what	the	













not	all,	 of	 the	 conditions	he	proposes	are	unclear,	 suspect,	or	unnecessary.	 I	will	 exposit	 the	
first	two	individually,	commenting	only	briefly	on	the	latter	three.	
1.	Universal	Extension.	




















In	 the	 second	 sense,	 the	 object	 of	 study	 is	everything,	 albeit	 indirectly.	 The	 object	 of	
study	would	be	macro-categories,	 abstractions,	 and	any	 concept	 (possible	or	 impossible).	On	
this	 reading,	 metaphysics	 would	 properly	 study	 the	 categories,	 but	 other	 things	 (indeed,	 all	
things)	are	brought	in	view	only	by	implication	or	indirectly.	Thus,	for	example,	a	table	is	not	a	
proper	 object	 of	 metaphysical	 study;	 however,	 since	 metaphysics	 studies	 categories	 and	
predicates,	any	predicates	that	apply	to	tables	would	bring	tables	into	metaphysics’	periphery.	
Metaphysics	 then	 speaks	 to	everything	 indirectly	 as	 it	performs	 its	unique	metaphysical	 task.	
This	reading	has	support	as	Gracia	suggests	that	metaphysics	would	ask	questions	regarding	the	
most	 general	 things,	18	and	 that	 “metaphysics	 studies	 categories”	19	and	 that	 it	would	exclude	
singular	concrete	objects,	“such	as	‘Socrates’.”	20	
It	is	not	obvious	that	one	sense	is	to	be	preferred	over	the	other.	One	way	to	determine	
could	 be	whether	 one	 sense	may	 be	more	 successful	 (as	 a	 sufficient	 condition)	 at	 providing	
fundamentality.	To	that	end,	the	first	sense	is	very	similar	to	the	third	criterion,	such	that	it	may	
imply	 and	 obviate	 a	 separate	 condition.	 The	 third	 criterion	 deals	 with	 the	 claims	 of	








the	 third	 is	 unnecessary.	 However,	 if	 the	 second	 sense	 is	 preferred,	 it	 is	 not	 obvious	 how	
Gracia’s	project	differs	from	the	first	principles	approaches	he	notes	to	have	limited	success.21	
The	last	feature	of	this	condition	is	that	the	inclusiveness	should	extend	to	metaphysical	
approaches	 themselves,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 successes	 and	 failures	 of	 historical	
metaphysical	inquiries.	He	argues	that	in	order	for	metaphysics	to	be	fundamental	it	does	not	
need	 to	 (and	 must	 not)	 decide	 at	 the	 outset	 among	 different	 “reductionist”22	accounts	 of	
metaphysics.	 Rather	metaphysics	would	draw	 from	all	 prior	 investigations	 in	which	 someone	
found	an	object	worthy	of	study,	whether	an	Aristotelian	being	qua	being,	or	even	those	that	
investigate	Nothing	or	Non-being.	
The	acceptance	of	 this	 condition	has	 a	 cost.	 Tentatively	 assume	as	 a	benefit	 that	 this	




unclear	 how	 the	 discipline	 would	 be	 able	 to	 regard	 the	 investigation	 of	 non-being,	 on	 the	
whole,	 a	 failure:	 perhaps	 it	 can	 never	 make	 such	 a	 determination.	 24 	To	 me	 this	 is	 an	













including	all	 ontological	 categories	and	methods,	 they	must	be	 framed	neutrally	 so	as	 to	not	
bias	 our	 development	 of	 metaphysics.	 This	 seems	 prima	 facie	 desirable,	 since	 a	 premature	
judgment	 of	 a	 “particular	 conception	 of	 the	 discipline”	 would	 indeed	 eliminate	 meta-
metaphysical	views	by	implication.	
Yet	 how	 is	 neutrality	 as	 Gracia	 intends	 even	 possible?	 Not	 only	 does	 every	
metaphysician	evaluate	 from	a	vantage	 (even	when	one	has	an	open	mind),	 it	 is	not	obvious	




whether	 it	 is	 “an	 unnecessary	 reductionist	 gimmick”25	to	 evaluate	metaphysics	 from	 starting	




metaphysics	 as	 a	 genuine	 discipline.	 Gracia	 is	 correct	 to	 assert	 that	 if	 metaphysics	 were	
fundamental,	then	its	discipline	must	be	distinct	and	not	simply	an	“aggregate	of	claims”	made	







their	 narrow	 focus	 and	 perspective. 28 	 29 	Fifth,	 metaphysics	 must	 make	 necessary	 claims.	
Progress	is	the	establishment	of	more	accurate	necessary	claims,	even	if	they	can	be	called	into	
question	 or	 improved	 upon.	 This	 condition	 is	 certainly	 desirable,	 especially	 if	 the	
determinations	 in	metaphysics	 (if	 progress	 is	 possible)	would	 have	 import	 for	 the	 disciplines	
founded	upon	metaphysics.	Hence,	I	have	no	major	concern	here.	
Conclusion	
	 Let’s	 take	stock,	 then,	what	 I	have	attempted	 to	show.	First,	 that	 the	establishment	of	
fundamental	 science	 is	 desirable	 given	historical	 considerations.	 Second,	 that	 the	proposal	 as	
stated	 needs	 revision	 on	 two	 fronts	 before	 it	 can	 be	 a	 fundamental	 science:	 its	 regarding	
predication	as	all-inclusive	is	actually	unintentionally	exclusive;	its	goals	should	seek	to	establish	
principia	or	norms	 for	 sciences.	Third,	when	examining	 the	 individual	 conditions,	 the	 first	has	
some	significant	problems	in	implementation;	the	second	is	overly	optimistic	about	neutrality;	
the	third,	fourth,	and	fifth	conditions	seem	necessary	to	the	fundamental	project	and	require	no	
significant	 revisions.	 Thus,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 a	 fundamental	 science	 may	 perhaps	 be	
established,	but	not	as	Gracia	has	proposed.	
																																																								
27	Gracia,	309-310.	Underlining	mine.	
28	Gracia,	310.	
29	Could	a	sub-discipline,	e.g.,	philosophy	of	science	or	ontology	proper,	handle	this?	
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